Appendix 2c - The End Justifies the Means

It would not be so bad if the distortions and perversions of the pseudo-philosophers were restricted to disputes in ivory towers. Unfortunately such distortions and perversions have a way of filtering down into everyday life.

One way they do that is by the contamination of the language that is used in the course of human affairs. The sociological effects, though subtle, can be profound. Such distinctly human effects can best be seen in terms of values that are caused to shift in relation to the various purposes of human activity.

Purposes, goals, or ends of either an individual or a society are derived from moral imperatives, i.e., what each believes ought to be.
 

The moral imperatives are derived from the logical imperatives, i.e., what is necessary to maintain consistency and order.
 

The logical imperatives, in turn, are derived from the natural imperatives, i.e., the laws of nature that govern the universe, e.g., cause and effect.

Or is it the other way around?

It seems that the "processes" indicated here are two way relations with "feedback". Thus, today's purposes are both effects and causes at the same time; they are the effects of yesterday's experiences and actions, and the causes of today's actions and experiences. Today's actions and experiences are in turn causes of tomorrow's goals, actions, and experiences.

As a tribute to the foibles of man, I shall give an example of a double reverse distortion of language in which a lie is stated and understood as a truth, while the truth it negates has been so contaminated by outrageous use that it is generally considered to be a lie.

The proposition that
 

,

is true, at least in the trivial sense that the end is the cause, or reason for employing the means.

It is also true from a common sense point of view. Ask anyone why he is doing something, and the usual response will be a statement of his goal or purpose. Why take actions that are intended to achieve no purpose? Thus, the means are justified by the end. In this formulation of the proposition, it is fairly clear that there must be some consistency between them. It would be silly to employ means that could not cause the desired end as their result.

That proposition, though true as formulated, has been - and still is - held to be false, to be a "lie", by everyone except the Machiavellians (Niccolo Machiavelli, 1469-1527). They so contaminated the meaning of the term justify that it is taken to mean it "excuses" any action, no matter how "evil", so long as the intended or stated purpose is desirable. Actually, the Machiavellian formulation of the proposition is not the same as the original true proposition. It contains an unstated, but implied, modifier and could be stated as: "the end justifies any means". A small change, but one that clearly shows the difference in meaning compared to the first true formulation.

To state the falsity of the second formulation, it would seem only necessary to negate it by a third formulation: "the end does not justify any means". The problem with that is that it is ambiguous unless it is modified to also restate the true proposition in a fourth formulation:
"the end does not justify any means, but only those means which are consistent with that end."
The fourth formulation is clumsy, though it is just as trivially true as the first formulation, with the explicit inclusion of the implied ability of the means to actually cause the end. Thus it becomes a statement of another set of propositions:
 

Good ends require good means.
Evil means produce evil ends.
Evil cannot come from good means.
Good cannot come from evil means.
 

The truth of these additional propositions is dependent on the truth of the first formulation with the understanding that the term justify necessarily implies a logical imperative of "consistency", from which the moral imperatives of "justification" are derived by judgments.

If the third formulation is left without the modifying clause, it seems to mean the same thing as the fifth formulation, which is the most usual formulation stated by non-Machiavellians to be true; i.e., "the end does not justify the means". But there is also another meaning that could be attached to the third formulation.
"The end does not justify any means."
can be taken as a proposition that denies any relationship between "means" and "ends" that would be similar to Hume's proposition which severed the relationship between "cause" and "effect".

Enough has been said about that type of proposition already that it is not necessary to pursue it any further. I do wonder, however, whether Hume was influenced by Machiavelli. In any case, that does not appear to be the intended meaning of the proponents of the fifth formulation. Clearly their intention is to counter - to offset - the perversions of the Machiavellians as stated in the second formulation, while retaining the "commonsense" truth of the first formulation.

There are still several problems with the fifth formulation. Comparing it directly to the first formulation, it appears to be a direct denial of the truth contained in that formulation as understood in "commonsense" terms. No matter how trivial that truth might be, it would be desirable to retain it. The problem is compounded by the fact that the Machiavellians have already "usurped" the first formulation as their own and by it they explicitly state a truth while implying a lie.

Putting the first and fifth formulations "side by side" to compare them directly might be helpful.

The end justifies the means.
The end does not justify the means.
 

If the first is true, it appears that its negation must be a lie. However, the intended meaning of the fifth formulation can be clarified by another "clumsy" formulation similar to the fourth formulation by adding a modifying clause; i.e.,
the end does not justify the means,
... unless they are consistent with each other.
 

The problem with that sixth formulation is that the lie is stated explicitly, in a negative form, and then it is negated by the explicit statement of the intended implication. The double negation restores the original intended meaning of the first formulation. Thus the first and sixth formulations have the same meaning, just as the first and fourth formulations do.

The most interesting thing about the fifth formulation is that it can be, and usually is, used alone, with the understood meaning of the fourth and sixth formulations being incorporated by implication. Thus the fifth formulation is an explicit lie that is understood to be true by an implied double negation. In addition, the truth it contains is the same as the explicit truth of the first formulation without the Machiavellian implication.

A rather startling result. A lie defining truth, just as truth can define a lie. Two statements that are directly contradictory, yet they can communicate the same meaning.

The possibility that even an overt and blatant lie can lead to an understanding of truth - if analyzed carefully - is most intriguing. Even the devil's advocate could force us to gain a deeper understanding of truth.

Human relations,
understanding,
judgments,
laws,
strategies,
etc.,
can get very complicated and confusing. They could also be simplified by including, rather than excluding, common sense.

"Golden rules" are not always easy to apply. There are some very peculiar people in the world. Some of them might actually despise what I like. I wonder at times what those peculiar people might think of me, but perhaps they should be treated the way they would like to be treated, rather than the way I would.

That still poses a problem. They might want what is not good for them. What am I supposed to do then? Who is to judge?

Is it sadistic to treat a masochist with kindness? Is it perverted to treat a perversion without perversion? Is it consistent to use an inconsistent hypothesis to develop a theory of inconsistency? Is it legitimate to use an illegitimate fraction to prove incommensurables have no "common measure"?

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